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The End(s) of Legal Education
Frank H. Wu
Legal education is in jeopardy.
There is no longer suﬃcient demand for the juris doctor degree from
prospective students; the supply of seats exceeds the number of applicants
possessing the credentials that have until recently been preferred by each
respective institution.1 As a consequence, schools have had to implement
“tuition discounting” at unprecedented levels even to enroll fewer individuals
who are less qualiﬁed by conventional predictors.2 Meanwhile, the mainstream
press, with encouragement from the organized bar, has excoriated the legal
academy for its failures, whether real or perceived.3 These critics have wondered
about the “return on investment.”4
I oﬀer ruminations on the “business model” of legal education. These
musings were presented in my speech to the participants in this symposium
on “The Future of Legal Scholarship” at Northeastern University in spring
2016. I use the term “business model” deliberately and advisedly, out of the
Frank Wu is a Distinguished Professor at the University of California Hastings College of the
Law, where he was formerly Chancellor & Dean. This article is a sequel to an earlier collection
of blogs, edited for the semi-annual symposium on leadership in legal education. Frank H. Wu,
Reforming Law Schools: A Manifesto, 46 TOLEDO L. REV. 417-438.
1.

The Law School Admissions Council releases extensive applicant volume data. See
Three-Year Volume, LAW SCH. ADMISSIONS COUNCIL, http://lsac.org/lsacresources/data/threeyear-volume (last visited July 11, 2016).

2.

See, e.g., The Law Schools that Oﬀer the Biggest Tuition Discounts, BLOOMBERG http://www.
bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-09-08/the-law-schools-that-oﬀer-the-biggest-tuitiondiscounts (Sept. 8, 2015); Karen Sloan, It’s a Buyer Market at Law School: Suddenly in Demand,
Prospective Students Wonder, “How Much Money Can I Get?,” NAT’L L.J. (June 25, 2012), http://
www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202560485444/Its-a-buyers-market-at-law-school?slreturn=20160624180321. The “discount rate” has continued to increase throughout higher
education. See Rick Seltzer, Discounting Hits New Highs, INSIDE HIGHER EDUC. (May 16, 2016),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2016/05/16/discount-rates-rise-yet-again-privatecolleges-and-universities. See also Maggie McGrath, The Invisible Force Behind College Admissions,
F ORBES (July 30, 2014), V http://www.forbes.com/sites/maggiemcgrath/2014/07/30/
the-invisible-force-behind-college-admissions/#7f2fd136efbc.

3.

See, e.g., Noam Scheiber, The Law School Bust, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2016, BU1. See generally BRIAN
Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS (2012).

4.

Id. For a rebuttal presenting an empirical analysis of the economic value of the J.D. degree,
see Michael Simkovic & Frank McIntyre, The Economic Value of a Law Degree, 43 J. LEGAL STUD.
249 (2014).
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belief it is impossible to ignore ﬁscal realities, but with an abiding appreciation
of academic traditions.
In my talk, I made three basic points. These are descriptive claims that
should prompt normative conversations.
First, institutions of higher education are selling something. Teachers
might prefer that students not characterize themselves as consumers for the
sake of their own development as critical thinkers. Higher education is neither
a product nor a service. Education demands engagement.
Yet the assertion cannot well be disputed—higher education carries a price
tag. With the unusual exceptions of full-scholarship schools (for example,
undergraduate programs at Berea and Deep Springs), individuals who
matriculate pay for that privilege.5 They typically resort to debt ﬁnancing.6
Second, like any other economic entity, a law school has revenues and
expenditures. At the end of the day, the budget must be balanced. A law
school cannot run a deﬁcit repeatedly. As with any venture, insolvency is not
an ideal outcome. The American Bar Association, as an accrediting authority,
considers the sustainability of a law school in its approval process.7
The revenue is generated primarily from students. For the bulk of schools
that are “tuition-dependent” in the term of art, that sum is the enrollment
multiplied by the published tuition that is to be charged, adjusted by the
“discount rate.” Income may also come from an endowment, annual giving,
a state subsidy, and perhaps auxiliary enterprises. Most law schools are
“embedded” within a structure greater than themselves, and they also may
receive a subvention from a central administration while beneﬁting from
economies of scale.
In contrast, fewer than one in ten schools are “stand-alone” institutions.
Such schools show more clearly the workings of legal education, because by
deﬁnition they are dedicated exclusively to the ﬁeld and lack the support of a
surrounding campus. Credit reporting agencies, which are about as objective
as could be found an appraiser of the ongoing viability of a business, rate
5.

See Ten Best Colleges with Free Tuition in 2016, THE BEST COLLEGES, http://www.thebestcolleges.
org/10-best-colleges-with-free-tuition/ (last visited July 11, 2016). Other tuition-free/fullscholarship schools, facing ﬁscal challenges, have changed their policies, such as The
Cooper Union. See Tuition & Student Fees, THE COOPER UNION, http://cooper.edu/about/
ﬁnance-and-administration/ﬁnancial-faq/tuition-student-fees (last visited July 24, 2016).

6.

The Law School Transparency Project has sought to present these data. Debt-Financed Cost
of Attendance, LAW SCH. TRANSPARENCY, http://www.lawschooltransparency.com/reform/
projects/Non-Discounted-Cost/ (last visited July 11, 2016).

7.

See Standard 201, AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF
LAW SCHOOLS 99 (2015-2016), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/
misc/legal_education/Standards/2015_2016_aba_standards_for_approval_of_law_
schools_ﬁnal.authcheckdam.pdf.
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the independent law schools that issue debt. Moody’s has systematically
downgraded these schools as businesses.8
Third, law school spending is primarily on payroll. Among the people
employed at the school, faculty members receive greater compensation than
staﬀ members, on average.9
At virtually every law school, especially those that are AALS members, the
production of original scholarship is expected of professors—indeed, AALS
makes such activity a criterion for membership in its learned society.10 Unlike
the standard practice in STEM (science, technology, engineering, and math)
disciplines, however, few law professors receive external funding, meaning from
sources outside the school itself, such as the National Science Foundation, the
National Institutes of Health, or charitable foundations, for their pursuits. (In
many ﬁelds, stature and even job security depend on such money.)
The logical conclusion from these premises is that students at most schools
remit tuition in part to support faculty performing research. The only exceptions
are extraordinary law schools that control their own sizable endowments and
can use the annual income from the corpus to support faculty research and
scholarship.
Since all but the most elite schools devote tuition revenues substantially to
faculty salaries, the teaching and the research functions essentially are bundled
8.

The Moody’s report is proprietary and available only by subscription. An example of
analysis of its conclusions is Dan Filler, Analyzing Moody’s New Report on Law Schools (May 8,
2014), http://www.thefacultylounge.org/2014/05/analyzing-moodys-new-report-on-lawschools.html.

9.

The Society of Law Teachers collects such data, since the ABA was precluded from doing
so by an antitrust settlement (observed beyond its time limit). See 2014-2015 SALT Salary
Survey, 2015 SALT EQUALIZER 1, https://www.saltlaw.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/
SALT-salary-survey-2015-REVISED-ﬁnal.pdf. Cf. Professionals in Higher Education Salary Survey,
COLL. & UNIV. PROF’L ASS’N FOR HUMAN RES., http://www.cupahr.org/surveys/phe.aspx
(last visited July 24, 2016) (comparable survey of higher education professionals who are not
faculty members).
A signiﬁcant issue, beyond the scope of this article, is that of administrative costs—
including those of executives. At most institutions, cuts over the past few years have aﬀected
staﬀ more than faculty. At UC Hastings, for example, even as I eliminated thirty-two of
200 staﬀ positions in the ﬁrst-ever comprehensive layoﬀ, we protected all faculty from the
process and even continued to hire tenure-track professors. Many of the new requirements
imposed on institutions have necessitated additional personnel. Sexual assault prevention
and remediation, a laudable cause, has been mandated, and that means specialists with
expertise must be hired. See Anemona Hartocollis, Colleges Spending Millions to Deal With Sexual
Misconduct Complaints, N.Y. TIMES (March 29, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/30/
us/colleges-beef-up-bureaucracies-to-deal-with-sexual-misconduct.html?_r=0. As for
compensation of the most senior leaders, I agree it has become excessive, but I also know
better than to brag about one’s own virtues. I will note only that I returned well into the
six ﬁgures from my own salary to a scholarship fund for students oriented toward public
interest, refused raises, and otherwise held down perquisites.

10.

ASS’N OF AM. LAW SCHS., Bylaws of the Association of American Law Schools, in 2016 HANDBOOK §
6-1(b)(2) (“The Association values and expects its member schools to value . . . scholarship,
academic freedom, and diversity of viewpoints.”).
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together as a package; it is impossible at the better law schools to purchase
the former without contributing to the latter. Students who wish to be trained
to join a profession are required to underwrite professors’ own intellectual
interests. There is no option to disaggregate teaching and research, at either
the institutional level or the individual level.11
It could be argued that students receive an incidental beneﬁt, because
professors who are especially productive improve the scholarly reputation of
the school, and that reputation, in turn, boosts rankings.12 In an instrumental
albeit indirect manner, students spend for reputation and rank, enhancing
their own employment prospects.13
Therefore, we should perform a cost-beneﬁt analysis for the sake of our
students. Discussions about legal scholarship tend to be caricatured or
hyperbolic. They proceed from either the proposition that said scholarship
is invaluable and cannot be reduced to crass measurements applied in other
contexts, or from the proposition that virtually all of law faculties’ published
output is manifestly useless and mere self-aggrandizement.
More accuracy and nuance are imperative. Assuming that legal scholarship
has some intrinsic value,14 the issues are whether that beneﬁt is commensurate
with the cost, and, as important, by whom it should be borne.
11.

There is no law school analogue to the selective liberal arts college. Liberal arts colleges
belong to a separate Carnegie classiﬁcation from research universities, and they are ranked
in a separate list by U.S. News & World Report (which adopts the Carnegie system). The elite
liberal arts colleges have faculty who perform research—and they would claim, and I would
not dispute—of the same quality, albeit lesser quantity, than their counterparts at a researchintensive institution. Williams can be number one, despite Harvard.
Because law schools are ranked on a unitary scale, there is no such thing as a law school
that is the equivalent of the selective liberal arts college. It likely could not develop without
a separate Carnegie classiﬁcation and separate list in U.S. News.
For more background on the Carnegie system, see Deﬁnitions, CARNEGIE CLASSIFICATION
OF INST. OF HIGHER EDUC., http://carnegieclassiﬁcations.iu.edu/deﬁnitions.php (last visited
July 24, 2016).

12.

See Theodore Eisenberg, Assessing the SSRN-Based Law School Rankings, 81 IND. L. REV. 285
(2006); Theodore Eisenberg & Martin Wells, Ranking and Explaining the Scholarly Impact of Law
Schools, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 373 (1998).

13.

See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, AFTER THE JD: FIRST RESULTS OF A NATIONAL STUDY OF
LEGAL CAREERS 42-44 (2004) (showing importance of law school selectivity on initial salaries
following graduation).

14.

Lest a reader come to an erroneous conclusion about my opinion, I note that I have
written extensively in blogs about the value of rule of law and, speciﬁcally, the role of legal
scholarship, using examples such as product safety in China as compared with the United
States, the public policy issues presented by autonomous vehicles, and the contributions
scholars can make on a decision such as secession of a state. See Frank H. Wu, How the
Rule of Law Helps Us Buy Flax Seed Oil, LINKEDIN (Feb. 14, 2014), https://www.linkedin.com/
pulse/20140214170447-13561052-how-the-rule-of-law-helps-us-buy-flax-seed-oil?trk=mpreader-card; Frank H. Wu, The Future of Scotland and the Role of Scholars, LINKEDIN (Sept. 12,
2014), https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/20140912205642-13561052-the-future-of-scotlandand-the-role-of-scholars?trk=mp-reader-card; Frank H. Wu, How Autonomous Vehicles Will Come
to the Road: Rule of Law, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 17, 2015), http://www.huﬃngtonpost.com/
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I happen to be skeptical about the sustainability of the current “business
model.” I doubt the capacity of institutions, other than those with the greatest
resources, to compete indeﬁnitely with one another to simultaneously enroll
suﬃcient numbers of students to make their budgets, as well as to defeat rivals
in the rankings. Speciﬁcally, I am concerned about whether they can perform
both of those tasks under the constraints of the supply of seats exceeding the
demand and under the current regime of rankings methodology, distinct from
the discussion of whether they ought to do so. My contention is that they
cannot do both simultaneously, whether or not that is some sort of ideal.
One or the other is feasible. But choices must be made between, on the
one hand, enrollment and hence revenue, and, on the other hand, selective
metrics. Those choices give rise to (or should set in motion) discussions about
competing objectives.
Here is the most concrete example of how the decision plays out.15 In the
summer, law schools turn to their wait lists for “enrollment management”
purposes. They increasingly game the wait lists, as applicants do; they keep
a signiﬁcant reserve of potential ﬁrst-year students on the wait lists, because
outright acceptance will aﬀect their admissions rate (and rankings), while
outright rejection risks ending up with far too few incoming students. As they
lose students who have paid deposits, because of better oﬀers (including the
decision not to attend any law school at all), they can admit replacements. The
wait list consists primarily of students with one or another credential (LSAT
or UGPA) lower than what the law school would prefer (probably its median
for that indicator).16 The trade-oﬀ is presented. Admitting that next student
means more tuition revenue and a slight slide toward the “tipping point” of
the LSAT or UGPA falling a point or tenth of a point, respectively; rejecting
the student means less tuition revenue and preserving the qualiﬁcation.
The complication is that the dilemma is faced by more than a single school.
It is faced by almost all of them.
frank-h-wu/how-autonomous-vehicles-w_b_8831644.html.
The Scotland piece alludes to BRAD R. ROTH, SOVEREIGN EQUALITY AND MORAL
DISAGREEMENT: PREMISES OF A PLURALIST INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER (2011); JOEL SAMUELS
ET AL., TRANSNATIONAL LAW: AN INTEGRATED APPROACH TO THE WORLD LEGAL Order (2013);
Brad R. Roth, Secessions, Coups, and the International Rule of Law: Assessing the Decline of the Eﬀective
Control Doctrine, 11 MELBOURNE J. INT’L L. 393 (2010); Brad R. Roth, The Virtues of Bright Lines:
Self-Determination, Secession, and External Intervention, 16 GERMAN L.J. 384 (2015) (Special Issue on
the Crisis in Ukraine); Joel Samuels, Condominium Arrangements in International Practice: Reviving
an Abandoned Concept of International Boundary Dispute Resolution, 29 MICH. J. INT’L L. 727 (2008).
15.

For a description of the decision by one school, see Elizabeth Olson, Minnesota Law School,
Facing Waning Interest, Cuts Admissions, N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 2016), http://www.nytimes.
com/2016/05/13/business/dealbook/minnesota-law-school-facing-waning-interest-cutsadmissions.html.

16.

See Natalie Kitroeﬀ, The Smartest People Are Opting Out of Law School, BLOOMBERG (April 15, 2015),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-04-15/the-smartest-people-are-opting-outof-law-school; and Jordan Weissmann, Desperate Law Schools Are Admitting Way Too Many Poorly
Qualiﬁed Students, SLATE (Oct. 29, 2015), http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/2015/10/29/
law_schools_are_admitting_too_many_poorly_qualiﬁed_students.html.
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The dean of each might be tempted, as in other prisoners’ dilemma
situations, to seek advantage for her school. A single actor could behave in a
manner that is rational in isolation, but irrational in the aggregate.
The thinking is that if one could hold on just long enough, perhaps with
predatory pricing, others will be driven out of the market or signiﬁcantly
weakened. Deans can try to use selective tuition discounting to buy highly
credentialed students away from schools ranked higher, or even some tuition
discounting to buy lesser-credentialed students away from schools ranked
lower (so long as the latter group doesn’t adversely aﬀect rankings). Or they
can gamble that the trends are temporary, not a permanent “new normal,”
such that they can ask for a loan from the central administration or tap into
reserves, to wait it out.
The alternative is to make decisions, very unpopular decisions. An overly
simpliﬁed but useful means to consider the choices tracks the revenue and
expenditure sides of the ledger. A school could maintain its revenue by
admitting students who likely will cause its rankings to fall. For many
schools a bit of room remains—such students would not be, strictly speaking,
“unqualiﬁed,” only less qualiﬁed than the school has been accustomed to.
Or a school could allow its revenue to decrease, bringing expenditures in
line. Since expenditures are human resources, that entails eliminating jobs,
increasing eﬃciencies, or both (and the overall cost of instruction is increased
by the amount that goes to noninstructional activities). Faculty, for instance,
could take on greater teaching loads, presumably to the detriment of scholarly
productivity.
Finally, were the law school applicant pool to burgeon once again to record
levels, the problem would be less obvious and urgent. It would cease to be a
problem for the law schools (and administrators and professors). But it would
remain a problem for the law students who are charged the tuition and have
reasonable expectations that the degree will be worth it.
Nothing in this situation is novel. It is the application of economic
principles accepted in everything from the manufacturing of consumer goods
to the rendering of professional services.17
Before the legal academy can address any of these problems, people—
speciﬁcally professors—must be persuaded that there is a problem, or set of
problems. If the belief persists that all that is needed is for a single individual
to emerge, with a diﬀerent strategy or the charisma to attract philanthropic
largesse, then as a corollary the nature of the diﬃculty, collective and structural,
will be denied.
That will lead to disaster.

17.

With respect to the legal profession, see RICHARD SUSSKIND, THE END
RETHINKING THE NATURE OF LEGAL SERVICES (2010).
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